Wednesday, April 15, 2009

Global solutions: effective, efficient, equitable?

A persistent theme in much writing about the coming decades is the need for global agreements that go a good deal further than the technical questions of environment management. Nicholas Stern (the author of the authoritative Stern Review on the economics of climate change) is typical of this line of thought:

But we have to act together, to create a global deal – this is a problem that is global in both its origins and its impacts.

That global deal must be effective, in that it cuts back emissions on the scale required; it must be efficient, in keeping costs down; and it must be equitable in relation to abilities and responsibilities, taking into account both the origins and impact of climate change. (From Stern's A Blueprint for Safer Planet, p.4)
Everyone seems to say as much, and as a statement of how we should approach the coming decades, it is impossible to contradict.

I just don’t believe it will happen. In fact I suspect that the most we can realistically expect is that the actions we take will be moderately effective. Civilisation will probably not collapse. But as for efficiency and equity, what is it in our performance to date that would lead anyone to expect either? I doubt that, whatever the deals we collectively agree too, our collective response will be anything of the kind. There are far too many countervailing forces for that to happen.

The efficiency of any future global strategy is almost certainly out of the question. As everyone admits, we are faced with global problems. But we do not have global systems in place to deal with them. On the contrary, our systems are not only fragmented but also full of conflict and antipathy between individual nations. There is also a profound conflict of interest between the owners and senior management of global corporations - the other most powerful economic players on the planet - and the rest of us.

Of course, in some profound sense we are all in this together, and completely failure will be fatal for all of us. But between here and complete failure there are many decisions to be made, each of which will benefit some and burden others. Reluctant though I am to say it of my fellow human beings, those who control the decision-making at each of these branching points will, more often than not, make sure that the decision is made in their own favour. That is to say, they will be decisions which are efficient for them. In Stern’s very appropriate words, they will be ‘keeping costs down’. This may mean keeping down the costs for humanity at large, but it will almost certainly involve minimising the costs of those who control the decisions. If this means increasing the ‘costs’ – the poverty, the danger, the hunger, the misery, the disease, the fear, the agony – of everyone else, then that will be presented as the best – or at least the least bad – alternative. Those who do not control these decisions will take the consequences. Which, in many cases, will be fatal.

As for equity, we have never taken this seriously in the past and I believe it will be a lot harder to take seriously in future. In the current (relatively) stable and affluent industrial world, only a handful of the most wealthy nations ever fulfils its public commitments on aid. We announce and re-announce help for long term development and short-term disaster, and then fail to live up to either. Given that the sums involved – currently just 0.7% of GDP – are so small that we would not miss them if we paid them in full, what can we expect of decisions about disasters that are not yet even visible. And in a future world of successive environmental crises, mass migrations, resource wars and much else, there will be far less concern for, let alone commitment to, equity. On the contrary, most of humanity will not even show up on the radar screens of the key decision-makers.

Why then should we expect equity from any future arrangements to curb climate change, resource depletion, ecosystems degradation, population growth and other environmental threats? I suspect that the real fount of future ‘equity’ is likely to be what it has always been - the economic power that countries like China, India, Brazil and Russia are already starting to wield. In a world of declining fossil fuels, the European Union will not be allowed to forget that Gazprom alone controls a sixth of the world’s natural gas reserves. The United States Treasury has long since started to eye nervously China’s enormous dollar holdings - they currently hold nearly $2 trillion in US Treasury bonds, whose manipulation could easily hole the entire western economy. These are people we will treat ‘equitably’ – because they come to the negotiating table as equals, not to mention rivals. But the hundred-plus countries that are each smaller than all of the world’s hundred largest companies? If GlaxoSmithKline, Cisco Systems and Wells Fargo are unlikely to be granted a seat at the top table, what can lesser economic entities like Estonia, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Trinidad and Tobago, Ivory Coast, Panama, El Salvador, Tanzania, Bahrain, Jordan, Iceland, Bolivia, Ghana, Paraguay, Zambia, Uganda, Botswana, Honduras and the many other yet smaller countries expect?

But not even the effectiveness of any future ‘global deal’ can be taken for granted. There are after all degrees of effectiveness. I previously suggested three levels of outcome for our current position: a setback comparable to a world war; an impact on our civilisation as a whole comparable to the fall of the Roman empire; and a threat to civilisation as such, comparable to a new ice age. As I have previously said, I do not know which we are really facing, but for all the reasons that we should expect neither efficiency nor equity, we should expect the effectiveness of our actions to be limited too - perhaps to the point where the twenty-first century goes down as the worst in history.

More precisely, we should expect rich and powerful countries that are situated in relatively cool regions to do as little as possible until they have no choice but to act in their own interests. That is after all what they have always done about global problems and what they have done so far about our current environmental threats. Even if they have the foresight to recognise that disaster in developing countries now will mean disaster for them later, they will almost certainly do only what is needed to forestall the later disaster to themselves. This will almost certainly be much less than preventing or remedying the original disaster to developing countries, no doubt accompanied by a great deal of hand-wringing, protestations of good intentions and dishonest claims to be taking ‘appropriate’ action. The real focus being on deflecting the negative consequences for the rich and powerful. Again going by our experience of aid, we will even find opportunities to benefit from the suffering of developing countries. Again, we always have. And then millions and millions of people will die.

The upshot of all this is simple. Simply continually asserting that our approach must be efficient or equitable will result in neither. If we want our response to the many environmental threats we face in the twenty-first century to be efficient or equitable, we must take a very firm and explicit decision that it should be so. More than that, we must create global institutions that represent humanity at large – which is to say, people rather the most powerful corporations and nation states.

It is hard to imagine what such an institution would look like. After all, none of our existing systems operate at that level. But in any case, I can still think of no compelling reason to expect any such institutions to be created even if they could be easily described, and the chances of their coming into existence will recede faster and faster as the real problems caused by 3° and 4° temperature increases start to hit us, as the global economy starts to unravel in the face of accelerating oil and gas prices and whole populations start to move in the face of poverty, hunger, disease and war.

Thursday, April 09, 2009

There's no money in saving the world

We continue to see the repercussions of relying on business to deliver our response to climate chaos, global warming and resource depletion. The last few days have thrown up these stories in the media:

  • Canadian environmental groups on Wednesday accused Royal Dutch Shell, Europe’s biggest energy group, of reneging on its promise to reduce greenhouse gas emissions at its oil sands project in Alberta. (FT, 8/4/09)
  • At least five big wind energy projects are in danger of being delayed or shelved owing to higher costs and a shortage of credit, the British Wind Energy Association said on Wednesday. (FT, 9/4/09)
  • Japan is expected to restart the world’s biggest nuclear power plant shortly – nearly two years after it was damaged by an earthquake. The prolonged shutdown of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant’s seven reactors knocked Tokyo Electric Power into the red and threatened Tokyo with electricity shortages during the hot summer months, when air-conditioner use pushes up demand. The facility accounts for 13 per cent of Tepco’s generating capacity and without it the company has been forced to rely on more expensive coal, oil and gas plants. (FT, 9/4/09)
  • Several prominent energy companies have scaled back their commitment to renewables, including BP, Shell and Iberdrola. (FT, 9/4/09)
And so on. On the other hand, Mars and Cadbury have promised to move to sustainable, Fairtrade supplies of cocoa (FT, 9/4/09). So we don't need to worry about Peak Chocolate just yet. On the otehr hand, I would not be very confident that they would ahve done anything about this were it not for ethically motivated public and staff pressure - as Fiona Dawson, managing director of Mars UK, has said, consumers and employees expected Mars to “do the right thing” because “nobody has to buy confectionery”.

The fact is, a monkey will type Hamlet before profit-driven companies will create a credible and effective answer to our many, many environmental problems in the middle of a slump. (I was going to say that Hell will freeze over, but at least that is one outcome global warming protects us from.)

Wednesday, April 01, 2009

President Obama, the Climate President

So Barack Obama has flown over to the G20 Summit in London with 500 people and several identical helicopters, most of which are flying solely as decoys to potential assassins. To talk about climate change as a small (and probably completely perfunctory) part of the agenda of a conference that will involve just 4 and a bit hours of talks.

May be a clue there about a) exactly how much difference this will make, and b) what the cause of climate change is. Thank God the protestors are there: otherwise it would seem like a complete waste of time.

Tuesday, March 31, 2009

The tragedy of the commons: tosh

One of the most famous essays in the history of economic thought was not, at first glance, an economic essay at all. Garrett Hardin’s 1962 paper in Science, ‘The tragedy of the commons’, bestowed a name on the whole class of social phenomena in which many people are vying for a given resource (e.g., the common land on which they can all graze their cattle and sheep), but because there is no control over how much each one can use it, they all try to use it more and more, until eventually the resource collapses through overuse.

The standard interpretation of this paper is that, had someone owned the common land, those would not have happened. They would have husbanded their resources more thriftily, nurturing it so that it was not exhausted. In this way, converting the common land to private property would save the say. This is supposed to be a lesson for our various environmental conundrums: if only someone owned stuff, they'd take care of it properly and all our climate/resource/ecosystem problems would go away. Hurrah!

It is hard to say why this idea should have caught on. Certainly from an economic point of view it is not very plausible – especially in cases that impact our current environmental problems. Take the case of non-renewable resources such as oil or gas or mineral wealth. A country such as Saudi Arabia may wish to conserve its fields so that future generations may also benefit from them, but that is only a factor because the Saudi régime has responsibility for future generations. The same cannot be said for ExxonMobil, BP or Total. Their paramount interest is quite clear and usually (by environmental and social standards) very short term: profit-maximisation. If they leave the oil in the ground they will incur continuing costs (rent, interest, maintenance and operating costs) while being unable to extract a single penny from their investments. They also run the risk that their resources will be taken from them by future governments. It is even possible that future fears of carbon emissions could lead to oil being banned from vehicles, power stations and other uses for which emission control is difficult.

By and large, oil wells are costly and precarious investments. So what should be done about them? Unless there is a realistic expectation that future price spirals will raise prices high enough to justify the risks and the costs, the answer is surely to pump it out of the ground and sell it right now. From a capitalist perspective, there is after all no other point in conserving such resources. In the ground they are worth nothing, and no matter how carefully I husband them, oil will not grow again. The only question is when the right balance of risk, cost and price tells me to start pumping. Given that time is a factor in all three of these, the chances are that the correct answer will be ‘soon’. Or if not ‘soon’, then ‘right now’.

So there is little incentive for a capitalist corporation to conserve non-renewable resources, and if the ‘tragedy of the commons’ argument is deployed to ensure that such resources are properly managed from society’s point of view, it will almost certainly fail.

But renewable resources aren’t likely to fare much better, and for very similar reasons. It is true that a forest or a field of ripening wheat is a valuable resource made all the more valuable by the fact that, carefully conserved, it will generate a return indefinitely. If I over-exploit it – by clear-cutting jungle or exhausting soil by intensive monoculture cropping and massive inputs of artificial fertilisers – then I will eventually shrivel it up to the point where it ceases to be a valuable property. In that respect at least, privatising is seems to be at least a possible solution to the potential tragedy of the commons.

Unfortunately the situation is not quite so simple. As before it comes down to a balance of prices, costs and risks. What if the cost of the resource is extremely low? If, for example, it can be acquired from a friendly government for a very low price? For instance, until his government was understandably overthrown in March 2009, President Ravalomanana of Madagascar had an arrangement with the South Korean conglomerate Daewoo to lease 1.3 million hectares of farmland – an area a little less than half the size of Belgium - for nothing more than a somewhat nebulous promise concerning local employment. Rent? Nope. Guaranteed return? Nope. Or what if – as is often the case in developing countries - the local population is simply ousted from the land?

In such conditions, costs do not include a significant price for the land itself. In other circumstances, other combinations will lead to the same conclusion: that it does pay (commercially, if not for society as a whole) for a private owner to exploit a renewable resource to the point where its vitality is destroyed and it is left worthless. At that point the company moves on, to new land and rapid returns. And the people they leave behind, whose land they have destroyed? Who cares.

So again, if I hand over a non-renewable resource to private interests, will this help society avoid the tragedy of the commons? Probably not. Indeed, so great is the disparity in resources between agribusiness and individual commercial farmers that even if both took an equally predatory attitude to the land (which, in the history of farming, farmers have not always been reluctant to do ), the damage would be done far faster by the corporations.

Note also the one option this approach does not allow for: that all the people who share this common resource will simply get together and agree how it will be used. Which is odd, because that is exactly how the land – the very ‘commons’ from which Hardin starts out – was managed before the triumph of capitalism. Medieval and early modern rural communities used to agree on who could use the land and how much. They also used to rotate who farmed which land, so that everyone had a fair turn at the best land. This method for avoiding the tragedy of the commons continued in use until the local landlord decided they could make more for themselves if they threw the peasants and the small farmers off the land and replaced them with sheep or cash crops. This process, know to European history as ‘the Enclosures’ is notorious as one of the most brutal in our history.

In short, the tragedy of the commons was not solved by the introduction of private property rights to the common land – rather, it was caused by converting socially managed resources into private property.

Social alternatives to privatisation have been shown to work over and over again all around the world. Over and over again local populations have demonstrated that they are capable of managing local resources is highly productive yet sustainable ways, given only access to modern knowledge and small amounts of specialised support. And yet over and over again they have been ousted by local landlords and international businesses intent on seizing their land for their own selfish purposes. This pleases international economic bodies like the IMF, the World Trade Organisation and the many other bodies that cannot imagine a solution to the world’s problems that does not start from global markets. It also pleases national governments, whose all-important economic indicators are nicely bolstered by the increase in GDP and other pleasingly visible data. After all, non-market economic activity, however fundamental it may be to the real lives of real people, is not visible in the economic data, and so is obviously not real. The only people it does not please, in fact, are the families who are expelled from the land and end up in the slums of a Sao Paulo or a Mumbai, hundreds of miles form home and with zero prospect of sharing in any benefits from their land being stolen from them.

There have been many cases where local people have organised themselves to share resources in ways that are both economically and ecologically sound. They owe little to market rationality and less to the idea that the only solution to the ‘tragedy of the commons’ is for someone to own everything and for the rest of us to work for them.

So why does enthusiasm for Hardin’s paper – historically false and logically unconvincing even when it was written – persist to this day, to the point where it is routinely cited by environmental economists and enthusiasts for markets alike? Because, I suspect, it creates a pseudo-historical, pseudo-scientific justification for the status quo. Despite the fact that capitalism is so destructive to the environment, the correct answer, say both Hardin and economic orthodoxy, is more of the same. You cannot have too much property, too much competition, too much exploitation – otherwise people might start to ask not whether we should have more but whether we should have quite as much as we have now. And that would never do.

Markets and the Return of the Economic Zombie!

As someone or other once said, generals always plan to fight the next war with the weapons of the last. Much the same seems to be true of economists. In the light (if that is the word) of the last year or two, the idea that market economics is still a contender for the basic model for the economy is quaint to say the least. Even if you take capitalism for granted (which, for the time being, I think we can), markets and market theory are hardly contenders for tools for managing it. The reason I say this is because a) markets don’t really exist, and b) even if they did, standard market theory is at best half-baked and at worst simply false.

Perhaps I should restate the claim that markets don't exist. Markets don't exist as market economists imagine them. The assumptions market economics is based simply do not apply to current economic conditions, and have not been relevant for at least half a century. Market theory has always assumed a number of things (the various perfections of 'perfect competition'), most of which only really exist in minimal, distorted and illusory forms.

For example, 'perfect information' was always nonsense and we have a whole raft of industries - marketing, advertising and lobbying - on hand to keep things that way. The recent history of financial engineering also demonstrates amply how easy it was for markets to be dominated by mechanism that many players plainly did not understand, so that they had little idea what they were doing from day to day. Even George Soros said he had kept clear of derivatives because he did not understand them. Recent developments such as ‘deep pools’ can only worsen this situation by deliberately concealing market information. There are some areas where markets are still quite real, but I doubt that plumbers and fish markets command much of anyone’s GNP.

As for another key condition for markets to be efficient, ease of entry, this ceased to make any sense when economies reached the scale where only major corporations and governments could summon up enough capital to enter any major industry. Conversely, ease of exit was rendered irrelevant with the arrival of large-scale fixed capital as the sine qua non of most industries. Fixed capital is notoriously difficult to dispose of at a decent price even when it is still usable, and if you are keen to exit a market it is probably because it is shrinking, so you won’t find anyone to buy it.

Likewise for all the other key assumptions of market economics. They make a neat, if narrow, theory, but none of them actually applies under modern economic conditions.

As for the idea that market theory is at best half-baked and at worst simply false, market economics claims that markets will always tend towards equilibrium. This is hardly what history would suggest, and it ignores at least two intrinsic features of market economies.

Firstly, the various kinds of market imperfection I have just mentioned all serve to push markets into disequilibrium, because they create special interests (often very widespread or of involving very large players) who are keen to seek, create and exploit disequilibrium.

Secondly, the real tendency of markets is not towards equilibrium but towards bubbles and monopoly. Bubbles arise when it is not the intrinsic value of goods and services that are being invested in but movements in the market itself (i.e., when, as Keynes put it, the speculative froth on the surface of the stream of solid investments is inverted into a maelstrom of speculation that drowns out real investment). This inversion became inevitable as soon markets become a forum for making money by speculation rather than for allocating scarce resources. When this orgy of money-making has reached the point where market players start to notice just how far this process has diverted the formal ownership of resources from any economically plausible use, collapse ensues as inevitably as the original bubble.

Given how market economists like to define the market as an efficient mechanism for distributing scarce resources, inveterate leftists like me find it grimly ironic to note that it capitalism itself, whose sole rationale is to make money, that ensures that markets lead inevitably to bubbles, the misallocation of resources and collapse.

As Oscar Wilde said, a cynic is a man who knows the price or everything and the value of nothing, so it’s nice to see that even in the impersonal world of the market, the inherent cynicism of market theory gets its comeuppance. Pity about the millions of ordinary people whose lives it destroys.

As for monopolies, as we all know, productivity is generally much improved by economies of scale. That in turn generally demands large-scale investment, typically in machinery and rationalisations that are closed to small players. But this reduces the number of businesses that can afford to operate in this market, or for which the size of the market leaves elbow room. And so the spiral starts and continues until only a handful of players is left. Not technically a monopoly, so there is still some limited competition, but even an oligopoly consists of a small number of players whose interests vis à vis their customer are identical – and identically predatory. And certainly any notion of a free market has long since disappeared.

Another nice irony of market capitalism then: as with bubbles, monopolies show how it is the very workings of historic markets that rendered modern market theory irrelevant. Not in this case because they create bubbles that destroy the value even as they generate lots of money, but because they create an economic universe in which, far from a large number of small players buying and selling, a small number of truly vast players distort the entire economy to suit themselves.

Basically, Adam Smith’s enthusiasm for the market was based on an economy of small players with small, easily liquidated investments in a large market. A nice dream of a cosy middle class world. Market theory persists with this dream. But we don’t live there any more.

Thursday, March 26, 2009

Leadership, Mr President? No thanks!

The United States is ready to lead. Barack Obama says so – in an article in yesterday’s Times. Oh good.

Actually, Mr President, I don’t think we need any leadership right now. The world has been its usual bickering and politically incoherent self while the USA was away, but actually I can’t think of anything that would have been better had it been around to offer its ‘leadership’ since 2000.

After all, what have the US government and its eager allies been up to all that time on the global stage? Iraq. Afghanistan. Radical disregard for climate change. Creating the sub-prime housing disaster. Deregulating finance to the point where the entire global economy was dislocated, millions thrown out of work and tens of millions of the already poor in developing countries were pushed down even further. The Washington Consensus thrust down everyone’s throats by the IMF, World Bank and WTO. I can’t say that American leadership is likely to lead us anywhere I would want to go.

Or perhaps it is American example closer to home we should admire. Gun crime. Banal culture. Corporate greed on a staggering scale. Untrammelled capitalism that, left to its own, would do it all all over again.

Meanwhile, who do they think they will be leading? The toadies in London, maybe. But France? China? Russia? India? Anyone at all in the developing world? No, not only do they not want American leadership but they would be deeply – and rightly – suspicious of anything the US government thinks is a good thing. With Russia as a neighbour and our energy supplies at Putin’s mercy, we Europeans have every reason to look for allies wherever we can find them. But leadership from the USA? No thanks. You may have the power - or at least, lots of guns and a proven enthusiasm for using them - but the authority leadership presupposes? What on earth makes Obama think American presidents have any of that left?

I like President Obama. He seems like a decent guy. But I still have problems with three things. Firstly, apart from his immediate reaction to the current economic disaster (largely created by allowing the American interpretation of capitalism – with which, as far as I can tell, Obama agrees - to have its reckless head), I have no real idea where he would lead us. Yes We Can? - Yes We Can What, exactly?. Secondly, until I see different, I will assume that American leadership will, as ever, assume that what is good for America is good for the world. This has not proved to be a very helpful policy in the past. And finally, I just don’t want his or anyone else’s ‘leadership’. I would be more than happy if the USA would just join in for once. Climate change in particular is far bigger than World Wars One + Two, so it would be nice if you could just show up on time for this one. If it isn't already too late.

Meanwhile, I really think it’s time Americans stated thinking seriously about the whole End of Empire thing. As we Brits know, it’s a long, slow, painful process that makes you do and say all sorts of dumb things. Ah, Suez… I have no idea how the Americans will handle a multi-polar world over the next few decades – no better than we did, I suspect. But as a word of advice, can I suggest that, every time an American president is tempted to say something especially fine and resonant, they stop and have a long think about it? It will probably turn out to be a lot of pretentious tosh that will just bore or exasperate the rest of us.

Source: We are ready to lead. Are you ready to join us? The Times. March 25, 2009.

Wednesday, March 25, 2009

What about asking us, Sir Nicholas?

In today's FT, Sir Nicholas Stern, who is currently Professor of Economics & Government at the London School of Economics and has served as Chief Economist at the EBRD and World Bank, argues for an independent authority to evaluate economic risk on behalf of the world.

Good idea. But his idea of independence is a bit limited - too independent, in fact. He rightly argues that it should, unlike the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Financial Stability Forum or the Bank for International Settlements, be beyond the influence of big countries and should have no lending or policy responsibilities that would bias its perspective.

Yet his idea of independence seems to revert to a now-antiquated notion that 'the economy' should be treated as just this system that rolls on, with no need for anything much more than the occasional warning and adjustment to keep it on the rails.

For the lead author of the UK Government's 2006 Review of the Economics of Climate Change, this is a little odd. Any such body certainly should have policy goals. Stopping the planet boiling might be a good one, and one that Sir Nicholas is more aware of than most. He is also singularly well equipped to say what that means, at least among conventional economists.

But focusing on climate chaos - and ecological collapse and resource depletion and the population explosion - are all themselves only sensible economic goals because they represent (in a still very abstract way) what society needs out of the economy.

So one final question: if this risk assessment body should be independent of governments, does it then have to be 'independent' of the people whose interests these governments that are so singularly failing to represent? That is the real risk: that all the institutions - political as well as economic - are tainted with the same economistic obsessions, and will not see the wood until all the trees have been burned down.

Source: 'The world needs an unbiased risk assessor', Nicholas Stern, Financial Times, March 24 2009.