Monday, March 15, 2010

Repo 105 - another Enron in the pipeline?

In the arcane terminology of the markets, a 'repo' is a transaction in which I sell you something today but guarantee to buy it back for a stated price at some stated time in future. ‘Repo’ is actually short for ‘repurchase’.

Dull, huh? Well, it may turn out to be a little more exciting than it seems. If you are near the end of the quarter and you’ve got a lot of liabilities and a lot of worthless assets and your accounts are going to look lousy, why not do a deal to repo the rubbish for billions, report these as sales (which they aren't) use the billions to pay off liabilities, and then once you have reported how healthy your books now are, borrow more money you can’t afford to buy back the rubbish you 'sold' a few days previously.

This is what Lehman's called a Repo 105. It makes your books look good, it fools the regulators and everyone is briefly happy, until the time comes when the size and riskiness of the deals is so huge no one will touch them and you fall with a resounding splash down the toilet.

This, it seems is exactly what Lehman’s did - round and round for years on end, until $700 billion of assets and liabilities was being held up by just $25 billion in capital - a ration of 28:1. Their boss, Richard Fuld, claims that he had no idea this was going on. So he is either lying or spectacularly incompetent, because a) this was the only thing keeping Lehman afloat, and b) the scale of the repos – $50 billion in the first and second quarters of 2008, for example – was so huge that even if it weren’t you’d need to be dead from the neck up not to have noticed them. And the banking regulators? This had been going on for years, and no one noticed or thought that it odd?

More importantly, there is now a growing suspicion that repos are a bit more pervasive than was previously realised – if Lehmann had been doing it for years and their accountants (Ernst & Youung) didn't care - they say they were 'comfortable with the policy for purposes of auditing financial statements' - it would make sense for any of the banks and the increasingly many other businesses and government institutions who rely on financial services to generate money have been doing the same. Coming to a bank near you soon? Already arrived but no one has told you? Never forget Enron and Arthur Andersen. As Tracy Alloway, the FT Alphaville blogger puts it, 'Think window-dressing on a massive, and possibly misleading, scale'.

The story is summarised here and its full grubbiess set out here. Well worth reading.

Friday, March 12, 2010

Human intelligence and the Birth of Reason

One of my many unpublished manuscripts is a book-length treatment of the origins, evolution and individual development of intelligence, entitled The Birth of Reason. It treats the concept of 'intelligence' in the same way a biologist might treat 'life' – i.e., as a general term for everything human beings and other natural intelligences are and do, rather than (by analogy with for example, ‘the organism’) a narrowly cognitive process. That is, it is designed to explain the full span of intelligent activity, including not only the usual cognitive powers associated with that term but also the possibility of history, consciousness, global social and economic systems and so on. It includes a comprehensive account of the relationship between human and other natural forms of intelligence, such as primates. I have never tried to have this book published. I don’t really know why not – it is complete, the few people who have read it have spoken very well of it, and there are no other treatments of intelligence in this extremely broad sense of which I am aware. If you would like to know more about it, I have created a new website from which the full text can be accessed.

Tuesday, March 02, 2010

Herbert Marcuse speaks from the grave!

Having recently quoted Huxley's Brave New World on consumerism, here's an equally compelling statement of the situation, from the German philosopher Herbert Marcuse:

Tolerance toward that which is radically evil now appears as good because it serves the cohesion of the whole on the road to affluence or more affluence. The toleration of the systematic moronization of children and adults alike by publicity and propaganda, the release of destructiveness in aggressive driving, the recruitment for and training of special forces, the impotent and benevolent tolerance toward outright deception in merchandizing, waste, and planned obsolescence are not distortions and aberrations, they are the essence of a system which fosters tolerance as a means for perpetuating the struggle for existence and suppressing the alternatives.
From Marcuse's Repressive Tolerance.

Well, for people of my generation it's an interesting quote. Marcuse was one of the intellectual stars of the Left during the Sixties, so for old times' sake...

Monday, March 01, 2010

Was it caused by fractional reserve banking? Not really.

Almost a year ago, I wrote an entry in my parallel environmental blog entitled Why capitalism must expand - whatever the environmental consequences. Rather surprisingly, yesterday I received a comment, from Jerry Fox, an American engineer and blogger. His comment ran as follows:

Capitalism supported by fractional reserve banking and the artificial support of governmental bailouts does require constant expansion both to pay off the inherent interest and to delay the inflationary effects of the money supply. I hope that you are not trying to lump the great system of free enterprise which has helped to make America the envy of the world, being linked to a Constitutionally maintained money supply, to this travesty that has come to be called "Capitalism". Under the former, there is no need for constant expansion to support a healthy thriving economy along with proper concern for any environmental issues.
I repeat Jerry’s comment here because it is equally relevant to a point I have recently been considering. There is a striking difference between the diagnoses and remedies offered by American and non-American bloggers and other commentators, which, quite by chance, Jerry’s comments expresses very well.

Here is my reply, which is equally relevant to this blog:
Thanks for your comment, Jerry. I sympathise strongly with the view that fractional reserve banking has played a terrible role in the current crisis, and my impression from tracking a number of American blogs is that this is widely held to blame for the crisis as a whole. However, I remain sceptical of the idea that this is a distinct phenomenon from capitalism proper, for two reasons.

Firstly, fractional reserve banking has been a feature of financial capitalism ever since the first capitalist banks came into existence – far earlier than the fist Europeans arrived in the Americas, let alone anything specific to the US economy or constitution. It is simply a matter of risk management: although I don’t have enough reserves to cover all my commitments, I take a chance that all the chickens won’t come home to roost at the same time. And by and large this has proved a good and familiar bet – to the point where one of Shakespeare’s best known tragedies, The Merchant of Venice, which was first performed around 1596-1597, depends entirely on a situation in which this bet on fractional reserves fails.

And it was essentially the recurring failure of this bet that led to regulations specifying exactly how much reserves were required for various kinds of transaction. In other words, there was no pure capitalist system with non-fractional reserves, which was then polluted by the creation of fractional reserve banking. Rather, capitalism was always a system of fractional reserve banking, which governments, sick the regular crises, eventually normalised with formal requirements for banking licenses, specified capital requirements, the 1933 Glass-Steagal Act, and so on.

As I understand it, the issue with the recent collapses was two-fold. When markets have been massively aligned (as they were, for many reasons, over the last few years), a boom that had looked fantastic turned into a bust proved that it was all just a fantasy, because everything went up and down at once. But even more importantly, the problem with many speculations (it’s hard to describe credit default swaps as investments) was that they were not required to be backed by any reserves at all. I have seen of what would have been a large enough reserve to cover most defaults and so forestall this crisis, and none of them were very different from the standard fractional reserve requirements for more conventional loans and obligations.

You can blame a number of technical features for this – the rise of ‘mark to market’ accounting, for example. In my own view, a more profound explanation lies in the process of systematic deregulation. This seems to have been a pretty universal phenomenon – certainly rife in London, where the absence of effective capital requirements made it the most popular financial centre in the world. Other centres tended to be more reserved (as it were) than London and the various US exchanges, but unfortunately they are collectively large enough to push the planet into a financial nosedive.

So fractional reserve banking played a role in the current crisis, but primarily because it did not extend to the specific types of transaction that actually brought the system down. Not much to do with the corruption of free enterprise or Constitutionally-protected monetary system.

Warren Buffett on financial CEOs

From Buffett's characteristically frank Chairman's letter in the 2009 Berskshire Hathaway annual report (p.18):

In my view a board of directors of a huge financial institution is derelict if it does not insist that its CEO bear full responsibility for risk control. If he’s incapable of handling that job, he should look for other employment. And if he fails at it – with the government thereupon required to step in with funds or guarantees – the financial consequences for him and his board should be severe.

It has not been shareholders who have botched the operations of some of our country’s largest financial institutions. Yet they have borne the burden, with 90% or more of the value of their holdings wiped out in most cases of failure. Collectively, they have lost more than $500 billion in just the four largest financial fiascoes of the last two years. To say these owners have been “bailed-out” is to make a mockery of the term.

The CEOs and directors of the failed companies, however, have largely gone unscathed. Their fortunes may have been diminished by the disasters they oversaw, but they still live in grand style. It is the behavior of these CEOs and directors that needs to be changed: If their institutions and the country are harmed by their recklessness, they should pay a heavy price – one not reimbursable by the companies they’ve damaged nor by insurance. CEOs and, in many cases, directors have long benefitted from oversized financial carrots; some meaningful sticks now need to be part of their employment picture as well.
Pity he was so effusive about what a great manager Lloyd Blankfein is last week.

But of course the powers that be will do very little about this. They are too implicated in this mess, they have too little understanding of what has happened over the last couple of years (other than in the technical sense), and they know that if they just wait it will start to look better.

More generally, we are all implicated in this mess. As I have observed elsewhere, the financial villains and incompetents were not the real cause of the collapse. far from being the enemies of our current economic system, they and their bubble-generating, monopoly-creating strategies, methods and objectives are its apotheosis. This kind of crisis is a perfectly natural conclusion of its routine self-development over a decade or so. And that, of course, places the real solutions even further beyond our present politicians' grasp: not only do they not understand how profound the problems really are, but they are neither willing nor able to exercise the kind of political control that needed to fix the problem for good.

Tuesday, February 23, 2010

Wall Street looting US Social Security

Interesting article entitled 'Wall Street Targets the Elderly: Looting Social Security'.

It's by Paul Craig Roberts, once editor of the Wall Street Journal, not to mention Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury. For an ex-WSJ editor, he has a refreshingly robust attitude to the bad guys:

Hank Paulson, the Gold Sacks bankster/US Treasury Secretary, who deregulated the financial system, caused a world crisis that wrecked the prospects of foreign banks and governments, caused millions of Americans to lose retirement savings, homes, and jobs, and left taxpayers burdened with multi-trillions of dollars of new US debt, is still not in jail.
Surely there is some application of the negligence or conspiracy laws that would allow us to put Hank and one or two (thousand) of his pals in the slammer?

Monday, February 22, 2010

James Hansen and the inexorable slide toward nuclear power.

On his Storms of My Grandchildren site, James Hansen talks about how intolerable coal-powered power stations are in any realistic future, and claims that:

in most countries, phase-out of coal emissions requires also a carbon-free source of baseload electric power that is competitive in price with coal. Until we have another way to meet 21st century energy needs while eliminating coal and carbon emissions, nuclear power appears to be the only option.
From this he infers that even nuclear power would be the lesser of these two evils, concluding that
The (“3rd generation”) nuclear technology ready to replace the aging 2nd generation reactors in the United States and other counties is inherently safer than existing nuclear power, which already has an exemplary safety record – however, it still burns less than one percent of the nuclear fuel and leaves a long-lived nuclear waste pile. Hansen recommends initiating urgent development of a fourth-generation nuclear power plant. These “fast” nuclear reactors utilize more than 99 percent of the fuel and can “burn” nuclear waste, thus solving the nuclear waste problem that concerns so many.
This doesn't seem to me to follow. Why is he so confident that these fourth-generation nuclear power plants are any less pie-in-the-sky than carbon capture? It's the first time I have heard anyone suggest that the problems of safety and spent nuclear fuel could be a thing of the past. I would very much like to hear Hansen's reasoning. Not that I would like CCS any more than him, but it doesn't make much sense to be asked to choose between two mirages.

But there's a more important assumption in Hansen's commentary. He argues that, if we are to avoid both fossil fuels and nuclear power, then we need 'a carbon-free source of baseload electric power that is competitive in price with coal'. It is certainly a most attractive option. However, my reading of the technical literature leads me to two conclusions. One, such an option will not exist for many years to come. And two, we can't afford to wait that long.

So how is it Professor Hansen can claim that the solution needs to be 'competitive in price with coal'? Given the magnitude of the potential problem - a series of disasters and creeping destruction that will dwarf any previous human experience short of, perhaps, a re-run of the global plague in the 14th century, surely this is like saying that we should have decided our strategy for the Second World War on the basis of whether it would have been as painless as peace.

Plainly this would be nonsense, and as in the case of WW2, there is little doubt what the consequences of continuing prevarication will be. Add to this the impact of ever-expanding resource depletion, ecosystems collapse and 40% more people by 2050, and waiting for another cheap energy source to come along sounds like madness. It would be nice if we were in a position to choose between cheap, friendly, familiar options, but we aren't. Meanwhile, our social, political and economic system is awash with people and interests for which an effective solution would be anathema, if not fatal.

Of course, we are not at war, and such metaphors are as likely to be misleading as helpful. But to pretend that we can reach Professor Hansen's own goals without paying a price and making preparations comparable to a war strikes me as unwarranted optimism, if not self-deception.